We develop an integrated, multi-period model of the optimal number of suppliers that combines considerations from search and coordination theory, transaction cost economics, and incomplete contracts theory. We assess our theoretical predictions using a new dataset on the global IT sourcing decisions of 1355 firms in 12 countries collected using a survey that we specifically designed to test our theory. Our empirical results support three key theoretical predictions about trust, fit and IT. First, repeated relationships and trust play a major role in supply chain governance. Several results together support this conclusion: (a) as firms work with fewer suppliers they also engage in more repeated relationships with those suppliers; (b) organizational and technological asset specificityand the need to induce relationship-specific investments are correlated not only with fewer suppliers, but also with a larger fraction of repeated relationships; and (c) under conditions of greater asset specificity, engaging a smaller number of suppliers is even more strongly associated with repeated relationships. Second, the need to optimize fit between firm needs and supplier skills is associated with the use of a greater number of suppliers. As firms' needs become more idiosyncratic and diverse, they engage more suppliers. Third, different types of IT have different implications for supply chain structure. Investments in technologies that reduce search costs and transaction costs are correlated with using more suppliers, while use of vendor-specific IT is associated with fewer suppliers. Our work extends the literature on the role of IT in supply chain governance by integrating multiple lines of theory in a repeated setting and using new large scale empirical evidence to test predictions about how IT use relates to both the number of suppliers and repetition in supply chain relationships.
Introduction
Although there is widespread interest in supplier networks and the role of information technology (IT) in business process outsourcing , Dong et al 2009 , there has been little empirical investigation of the role of IT in influencing the optimal number of suppliers. There are several theoretical predictions for when firms are likely to contract with more suppliers (Malone et al. 1987) , fewer suppliers (Bakos & Brynjolfsson 1993a,b) or when they are likely to 'move to the middle' (Clemons, Reddi & Row 1993 ), but comprehensive data on the actual numbers of suppliers firms use in sourcing specific products and services, and the degree to which these are long-term or one-off relationships, is scarce. A few notable studies examine single firms (e.g. Levina & Su 2008 , Levina & Vaast 2008 , Levina & Ross 2003 , Craighead et. al. 2007 , Dyer 1997 , trends in particular industries (Helper et. al. 2000 , Helper & Levine 1992 , Helper 1991 , Cusumano & Takeishi 1991 , Dedrick et al. 2008 , or divergent cultural approaches in the United States and Japan (Cusumano & Takeishi 1991) , but a lack of large multinational, multiindustry datasets makes it difficult to resolve conflicting theoretical conclusions about the appropriate size of supplier networks.
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In addition to the lack of empirical data, there are two important theoretical gaps in the literature on IT and supply chain structure. First, there is inadequate focus on repeated interactions and the role of trust in supplier relationships. Despite evidence that most supply relationships involve repeated interaction andan increased recognition of the importance of trust among both management scholars and practitioners, theoretical models of the optimal number of suppliers typically consider single period settings and empirical analysis is typicallyignores whether or not these arrangements represent long-term repeated relationships. Case study evidence suggests that trust and repeated relationships provide a critical mechanism through which firms create incentives for suppliers to make non-contractible investments (e.g. Helper et al. 2000) . In turn, reducing the number of suppliers can increase the probability of a repeated relationship with any one supplier, fostering a climate of trust. Theoretical models of the optimal number of suppliers that do not consider repeated relationships may place too much importance on reductions in the supply base as the sole incentive mechanism in supply relationships. We argue that considering a multi-period setting in which firms can enter into repeated relationships with suppliers to create incentives and develop trust can generate more realistic predictions that more accurately describe firm supply base strategies observed in real world settings.
Second, current research treats investment in IT as a single variable or considers a single technology and its potential effects on supply chain structure. However, different types of IT are likely to have vastly different implications for supply chain governance. While IT can support the coordination of many arms-length market transactions (Malone et al. 1987) , asset specificity in technology or organizational processes can also create lock in and motivate firms to develop long-term partnerships with suppliers in order to build trust and motivate relationship-specific investments (Srinivasan et. al. 1994 , Helper 1995 . Malone et al. (1987) argue that information technology will lead firms to increase the number of suppliers they work with by lowering transaction and coordination costs. Bakos (1997) makes a similar argument based on IT reducing search costs and thus making it cost effective to contract with larger numbers of suppliers. Conversely, Bakos & Brynjolfsson (1993a,b) show that when noncontractible relationship-specific investments are important, such as certain investments in innovation or quality, it can be optimal to restrict the number of suppliers in order to increase their incentives to make such investments. Vendor specific IT can support such long-term trust based relationships by creating high throughput, dedicated and transparent information exchanges between specific firms, creating lockin and dependence (Srinivasan et. al. 1994 , Iacovou et. al. 1995 . Prior evidence demonstrates the importance of distinguishing different types of IT assets in terms of their ability to support distinct strategic goals related to firm performance (Aral and Weill 2007) . Prior work suggests some types of IT such as enterprise management systems are associated with greater outsourcing, while others such as operations management systems are not (Bardhan et al 2007) . We argue the same is true in supply chain strategy and the optimal number of suppliers. Rather than having unidirectional implications on the number of suppliers, IT's impact on supply chain governance will differ depending on whether it reduces search and coordination costs or alternatively increases switching costs.
We address these two limitations of current research by developing an integrated, multi-period model of the relationship between IT and the optimal number of suppliers that combines considerations from search and coordination theory, transaction cost economics and incomplete contracts theory, and explicitly considers the long-term nature of most supplier relationships in a repeated game setting. In doing so, we build on earlier frameworks which have typically considered a single theoretical perspective.
We assess the predictions derived from our model using a new dataset on the global IT sourcing decisions of 1355 firms in 12 countries, obtained from a questionnaire we designed specifically for this purpose. As a result we gain insight into the evolving nature of supplier relationships, especially in the context of global IT sourcing. The data reveal that the vast majority of supplier relationships (83%) involve repeated interaction over time, which highlights the critical importance of modeling supplier governance as a repeated game. The empirical evidence also supports three important theoretical predictions.
First, repeated relationships and trust play a major role in supply chain governance. Several results together support this conclusion: (a) as firms work with fewer suppliers they also engage in more repeated relationships with those suppliers; (b) organizational and technological asset specificity and the need to induce relationship-specific investments are correlated not only with fewer suppliers, but also with a larger fraction of repeated relationships; and (c) under conditions of greater asset specificity, engaging a smaller number of suppliers is associated even more strongly with more repeated relationships. A key insight of our model that is supported by these results is that the cooperation and trust developed through repeated interaction can offer strong incentives for supplier investment without incurring the disadvantages of moving to fewer suppliers. While reducing the number of suppliers may encourage higher supplier investments, incentives in this type of an incomplete contracts framework still only achieve second best outcomes, making considerations of the costs of moving to fewer suppliers critical.
Second, there are a realcosts of moving to fewer suppliers, including fit costs and a loss of bargaining power, and these are an important part of firms' supply chain governance decisions. In our data, the need to optimize fit between firm needs and supplier skills is associated with the use of a greater number of suppliers demonstrating the importance of fit costs in supply chain strategy. As firms' needs become more idiosyncratic and diverse, they engage more suppliers. In contrast, in a repeated setting, firms can create incentives through long-term relationships without reducing their supplier base. This strategy does not require full contractibility but rather promotes the development of norms of reciprocity and cooperation through repeated interaction.
Third, different types of IT have different implications for supply chain structure -IT is not a monolith. Investments in technologies that reduce search costs and transaction costs are correlated with using more suppliers, while use of vendor-specific IT is associated with lock-in and fewer suppliers.We favor a contingent view in which firms simultaneously choose supply chain strategies and the specific technologies that support them.
Our work extends the literature on the role of IT in supply chain governance by integrating multiple lines of theory in a repeated setting and using new large scale empirical evidence to test predictions about how IT use relates to both the number of suppliers and repetition in supply chain relationships. We address calls in the literature for longitudinal research to "explicitly evaluate changes in the number of suppliers due to IT use" and "how firms, with the use of IT, adapt the way they govern economic activities in supply chains" (Dedrick et al. 2008: 31) by specifically investigating how IT affects the fraction of repeated relationships in a firm's supplier network (suppliers with whom the firm has contracted within the last year or within the last five years), and whether the fraction of repeated relationships in a firm's supply network is in turn associated with more or fewer suppliers. Our theoretical model integrates both incentives and costs in a multi-period setting, creating a flexible framework that captures the heterogeneous strategic considerations inherent in sourcing decisions. Our empirical evidence lends support to the model, highlighting the importance of repeated relationships and the varied implications of different types of IT in theories of the optimal number of suppliers.
Economic Theories of the Optimal Number of Suppliers
Decisions concerning the size of supplier networks and the length of relationships are influenced by a host of firm and industry characteristics and contingencies that have been addressed by various streams of research. Supply chain governance decisions are intimately tied to the boundaries of the firm, the specificity of technology and processes, the idiosyncrasy of firms' requirements, incentives for noncontractible relationship specific investments, and the development of informal cooperation and trust through repeated long-term interaction. In this paper we draw from four distinct but related bodies of economic theory to motivate and guide our model development: transaction cost economics, coordination theory, incomplete contracts theory, and multi-period game theory. Each of these perspectives contributes an essential component to our analysis and the resulting predictions about the optimal number of suppliers and the degree to which firms engage in repeated relationships with suppliers.
Transaction Costs & Asset Specificity.
Although markets can offer choice, create competition and minimize the costs of production, they also entail significant costs. The transaction costs associated with market procurement, including the costs of negotiating, monitoring and preventing malfeasance in partnerships are at times prohibitive (Coase 1937 , Williamson 1975 , 1976 . These considerations influence the decision of whether to locate activities inside the firm or rather to purchase services in the market, and also extend to selecting the optimal number of suppliers in firms' procurement networks (Bakos and Brynjolfsson 1993a, b) . A greater reliance on the market entails greater transaction costs and contracting with a larger number of suppliers generally entails arms-length relationships with higher risks of malfeasance. Maintaining relationships with a smaller number of trusted suppliers generally lowers the risk of opportunism, but is still riskier than bringing transactions and activities inside the firm. The risk of opportunism increases with asset specificity, since asset specificity makes it more difficult and costly to find an alternative supplier.
Coordination Theory, Search Costs & Fit.
Work in the IT literature has addressed similar questions and applied the notion of coordination and search costs to the determination of the optimal number of suppliers. Malone et. al. (1987) argue that coordination costs tend to be higher in markets than within the firm (where there is no choice of alternative suppliers), Thus, they argue that when IT reduces coordination costsit will disproportionately benefit market transactions. In particular, lower coordination costs favor a move from single supplier relationships within firms to multiple-supplier relationships in markets. IT reduces the information processing costs associated with both the search for market partners and transaction facilitation activities such as contracting, monitoring and the prevention of malfeasance.
The search costs argument, developed in part by Bakos (1997) as an extension to the neoclassical model formulated by Salop (1979) , contends that searching a larger pool of suppliers increases the probability of finding the price and product characteristics that best fit the needs of the firm, but that search costs are proportional to the number of suppliers searched. The larger the pool of suppliers searched, the greater the probability of a good fit between supplier skills and buyer needs and the higher the cost. As IT makes information processing less costly, it should theoretically enable firms to search amongst more suppliers and achieve better fit to their needs at lower cost. The growth of online business to business marketplaces demonstrates that this theory applies in practice, as firms can search a large number of suppliers and conduct relatively sophisticated due diligence at low cost (Bakos 1991 , Zhu 2004 , Overby and Jap 2009 , Zhu and Zhou 2010 . In addition, specific technologies for sharing information with partners and suppliers reduce communication and coordination costs in the execution of the interactions amongst partnering firms (Aral et. al. 2006) . These theories together predict that IT should drive firms to interact with more suppliers by reducing the costs of finding and interacting with them.
Incomplete Contracts Theory: Property Rights, Relationship Specific Investments & Trust.
Beginning with Williamson's (1975) observation that not every aspect of a transaction can be written intolegally-enforceablecontracts, the theory of incomplete contracts has recently been extended to include considerations of how parties bargain over non-contractible ex post surplus. Incomplete Contracts Theory (Grossman & Hart 1986 , Hart & Moore 1990 ) asserts that sincecontracts are not completely verifiable by third parties, property rights provide asset owners with the residual rights of control which in turn determine the bargaining power of parties to capture theex post surplus they create. Bargaining power affects the incentives of the relevant parties to make specific non-contractible ex ante investments that affect value creation in the relationship. Using these insights, Bakos & Brynjolfsson (1993a, b ) build a formal model of buyer-supplier relationships in which it can be optimal for the buyer to limit the number of suppliers in their network in order to create incentives for the suppliers to make greater non-contractible investments and Mithas et al (2008) show that incentive costs of non-contractibility can inhibit buyer use of reverse auction supplier markets. As intangible aspects of production and competition become more critical, the need to create these incentives becomes relatively more important. Incomplete contracts theory predicts that as the need for specific non-contractible investments by suppliers increases, firms should contract with fewer suppliers in order to give them incentives to make such investments.
Cooperative Behavior in Repeated Interactions
Ideally, theories of supplier relationships should be considered in a repeated game setting because cooperative behavior typically develops over time. Approaches focusing on a single transaction setting do not consider how ex post bargaining or ex ante incentives to invest are different in long-term relationships. Indeed, much of the existing qualitative evidence for the move to fewer supplier relationships stresses the importance of building trust and levels of information sharing that make such arrangements more efficient and productive than arm's length market transactions. Qualitative analyses of close-knit keiretsu supplier networks in Japan stress thatlong-term loyalty makes such networks and the firms engaged in them robust to periods of difficulty. Uzzi (1997) and others (e.g. Antonelli 1988, Piore and Sabel 1984) describe the information sharing and trust that develops over long-term relationshipsand case studies of value added partnerships stress reciprocity benefits that develop between firms over the long-term. Helper et. al. (2000) note that firms engaged in longer term relationships also benefit from "learning by monitoring," whereby the act of monitoring a partner's activities and service quality generates organizational and process learning that contributes to the overall efficiency and quality of the partnership while at the same time reducing opportunism and increasing trust. This evidence indicates that, in situations of economic conflict over non-contractible surplus with longer time horizons, cooperative behavior empirically contradicts selfish individual motives.Our model addresses the influence of long-term cooperative behavior on buyer-supplier relationships by including considerations of the discounted value of future partnership and the threat of partnership termination.
The single period setting limits equilibria to what is feasible in a one-shot game. The resulting outcomes have at least three important shortcomings from the firm's perspective. First, while reducing the number of suppliers induces relationship-specific investments, these investments are typically second-best as suppliers take into account only the portion of the return on their investment that they can retain in expost bargaining. Suppliers are therefore likely to underinvest. Second, reducing the number of suppliers reduces the expected fit between the firm's needs and suppliers' ability to fill these needs, which in turn reduces the expected economic surplus produced by the relationship. Third, contracting with a smaller number of suppliers reduces the buyer's bargaining power and therefore the share of the expost surplus they can appropriate. Thus increased incentives for supplier investment come at the cost of decreased profits and correspondingly decreased investment incentives for the firm. As a result, in a single period setting most firms would likely limit the number of suppliers in order to increase supplier incentives for relationship-specific investments only in situations where such investments are of critical importance.
On the other hand, in settings with repeated interaction, firms may be able to induce suppliers to make relationship-specific investments through mechanisms such as reputation, trust, reciprocity and loyalty. The set of Nash equilibria significantly expands in infinitely repeated games; for instance, the Folk Theorem provides that any feasible payoff in the stage game can give rise to a subgame perfect equilibrium if each player is sufficiently patient and is guaranteed a minimum level of utility (Fudenberg and Maskin 1986) . There is a voluminous literature on the emergence of cooperation in multi-period settings (Axelrod 1984; Fudenberg, Kreps and Maskin1990) but a key factor enabling this expanded range of outcomes and in particular enabling sustainable cooperative behavior is the possibility of punishment for non-cooperating participants. Such punishment can be accomplished through reputational mechanisms (Krepset al. 1982 ) but also through the threat of expulsion from the game (Hirshleifer and Rasmusen. 1989) , both of which depend critically on the ability to observe defection (which in this case is represented by suppliers' under investment).
Our approach addresses the influence of long-term cooperative behavior on buyer-supplier relationships and the overall importance of trust in these relationships by including considerations of the discounted value of future partnership and the threat of partnership termination in the traditional property rights framework.
An Integrated Model of Supply Base Reduction and Augmentation: Organizational and Technological

Determinants.
We develop an integrated model of supplier networks that incorporates transaction costs, coordination costs and incentives for non-contractible supplier investments. The model also explicitly takes into account the ongoing nature of supplier relationships by employing a multi-period framework in which the firm has repeated interactions with suppliers that need to make specific investments in the relationship over time. Table 1 illustrates the considerations identified above in determining the optimal number of suppliers. Specifically, firms need to trade off the benefits of more vs. fewer suppliers as shown in the rows of the table.A larger number of suppliers creates opportunities for a better fit between firm needs and supplier skills as well as improved bargaining power, while a smaller number of suppliers increases suppliers' incentives to make relationship-specific investments.
Organizational Determinants
Technological Determinants
More Suppliers
Better fit between firm needs and vendor skills; Improved bargaining power Lower search and coordination Costs
Fewer Suppliers
Relationship-specific investments; Non-contractible investments; Trust
Technological lock-in by increasing the complexity of a firm's needs and thus the importance of fit. As a result, the optimal outcome will depend on the specific characteristics of the setting and the technology, demonstrating the need for a flexible integrated model.
A Repeated Game Model of the Optimal Number of Suppliers
We model a multi-period setting with a firm and N potential suppliers. The multi-period setting permits outcomes that are not feasible in a single-period game, allows punishment of non-cooperating suppliers in future periods, and emphasizes the importance of reputation and trust. Suppliers are heterogeneous (for instance, they offer differentiated products or skills) and thus differ in their ability to help the firm fill its demand; thus while suppliers are ex ante indistinguishable, they differ in their ex-post "fit." A supplier's fit cost ˆ φ i (α ) can be computed after a period's demand is realized, and is drawn from a probability distribution φ(α) whereα is a fit parameter representing the cost of imperfect fit, i.e., all else equal a higher αleads to a higher fit cost. We denote by f (α,n) the expected value realized by the firm net of the fit cost when employing n suppliers; ∂f ∂α = −∂φ ∂α and thus ∂f ∂α < 0, i.e., f is decreasing in α .
Given the heterogeneity of potential suppliers, the firm benefits from having the option of selecting a different supplier in each period, thus maximizing the fit between its chosen supplier and the realized demand. Furthermore, being able to select from a larger number of suppliers will improve expected fit; thus the function f (α,n)is increasing in n. For instance, as in Bakos (1997) the fit parameter could indicate the distance between a supplier's "location" on a unit circle and the location of an ideal supplier, given the realized demand in a certain period; in that case in expectation f (α,N) = V − α /2N whereα is the "transportation" cost along the unit circle and V is the value derived when employing a perfectly fitting supplier.
Before the start of the game (in period 0) the firm selects n ≤ N long-term suppliers among the N potential suppliers. Identifying a new supplier is costly, and so is maintaining the base of long-term suppliers, for instance because of qualification and coordination costs. As a result the firm incurs a onetime cost Kand a per-period costκ for each long-term supplier, for a total per period "coordination" cost (K +κ)n for the first period andκ nfor each subsequent period.
Conduct of the game
In each period the firm realizes the demand from its customers, selects thelong-term supplier with the best fit (the "selected" supplier) to help fill this demand and places an order, the order gets fulfilled, production takes place, and the resulting surplus is divided among the firm and its suppliers. Specifically, the selected supplier gets paid an amount Y and is expected to make an observable but nonverifiable relationship-specific investment X (X ≤ Y ). If the selected supplier makes the relationship-specific investment the firm enjoys the surplus corresponding to the supplier's actual fit ˆ φ during this period;
however, since X is nonverifiable, the firm has no legal recourse against a selected supplier that fails to make the investment X, even thoughthe investment is observable and thus it knows that the supplier did not invest. In other words, X can be observed but cannot be contractually enforced in a court of law. All participants are risk-neutral and discount future costs and benefits at a discount factorδ per period, where
The selected supplier in each period chooses whether tocooperate (invest X) or defect (fail to invest). If the supplier defects, that supplier is never used in the future and is replaced by a new supplier.
Given there arenlong-term suppliers, a trustworthy supplier will be selected once every n periods in expectation. A cooperating supplier receives a payoff of Y − X every n-th period, for a present value
A defecting supplier receives Y and then is fired. In order to induce cooperation, a firm must offer the selected supplier a flow of benefits whose net present value exceeds the value the supplier can keep by simply defecting. Solving (Y − X) (1− δ n ) ≥ Y we see that, a firm must offer the selected supplier a period
−n , which is maximized for a finite number of long-term suppliers n* ≥ 1.Furthermore, the optimal number of suppliers n *increases as α increases, as κ decreases, as X decreases and as δ increases. This result shows that the firm selects the largest number of long-term suppliers that still supports the cooperative equilibrium among these suppliers. In that case, the supplier receives the higher of two payoffs: the minimum payoff required to sustain cooperation and what can be obtained because of the supplier's bargaining power. Assuming that in a period where the firm has access to n suppliers the coordination cost of κn is sunk, the cooperation of the firm and the supplier selected each period generates expected incremental value of f (α,n) − X . Following Hart and
Moore (1990), we can apportion the surplus based on each participant's Shapley Value, so that the firm will appropriate ( f (α,n) − X) n n + 1 and the suppliers will collectively appropriate f (α,n) − X n + 1 , which will be collected by the one supplier selected in each period. Thus in each period the selected supplier will get
The firm's corresponding profit will be min
In conclusion, the number of suppliers may be limited by the coordination cost if κ is large, or by the need to support cooperation if X is large orδ is small. The firm may need to offer the suppliers more than the minimum required to sustain cooperation if their Shapley Value is higher (for instance because n is small or f (α,n) is strongly increasing in n). Since the selected supplier gets paid Xδ − n , the firm will choose the supplier's required investment to maximize V (X) − Xδ −n , and thus unless δ = 1the supplier will underinvest relative to the first-best investment that would maximize the total surplus.
Partially Contractible Investments
We can easily allow supplier investments to be partially contractible. Specifically, let μ denote the degree in which supplier performance can be codified, and thus included in a verifiable contract, with 0 ≤ μ ≤ 1. If a supplier's performance is verifiable in degree μ , then a supplier that fails to make its noncontractible investment will receive a payoff of (1− μ)Y . Thus the case analyzed in the base model corresponds to 0 = μ . The minimum supplier payment required to induce cooperation is given by
and this gives
As μ increases, the optimal number of suppliers n *, which is the maximum number of suppliers that will induce cooperation, increases, i.e., the firm can employ a larger number of suppliers, as a selected supplier has a lower incentive to defect.
Partially Monitorable Investments
We can also allow supplier investments to be partially monitorable. Specifically, let m denote the degree in which supplier performance can be monitored, with 0 ≤ m ≤ 1. If a supplier's performance is monitorable in degree m , then a supplier that fails to make its non-contractible investment will be detected (and fired) with probability m . The case analyzed in the base model corresponds to m = 1. The minimum supplier payment required to induce cooperation
, as defection will only be detected with probability m , and thus in addition to Y , the defecting supplier will continue to receive with probability 1− m the value of the game next time it is selected, on expectation after n periods.
As m increases, the optimal number of suppliers n * increases, becausea defecting supplier is more likely to be detected and thus a lower future expected benefit from cooperation is required to induce cooperation. Another way to interpret this result is that as m decreases, the firm benefits from interacting more frequently with its suppliers as this gives it more opportunities to detect a defecting supplier, making it more likely that any given supplier will cooperate. Thus, as m decreases, fewer (and more trusted) suppliers will be employed to maintain the threat of detection and punishment, and therefore cooperation.
Ability to contract outside the set of long-term suppliers
If value can be created without the observable but nonverifiable supplier investment, it may be advantageous to the firm to go outside its set of n long-term suppliers when the realized fit from these suppliers is unsatisfactory. For instance, suppose that a fraction β ( 0 < β < 1) of the potential value from contracting with a supplier may be realized without that supplier making the investment X, and the firm may explore a "new" (i.e., not long-term) supplier from the set of N − n such suppliers by incurring a per trial cost ˜
κ . The basic model corresponds to setting β = 0. The expected surplus from working with a new supplier is βφ −˜ κ , and thus the firm will explore new suppliers when this is higher than the surplus
working with the best of the long-term suppliers, where ˆ f (α,n) is the realized value of f (α,n) and the coordination cost κn is treated as sunk.
We denote by ν the probability that the firm will realize higher ex-post surplus by using a new supplier. For low enough importance of fit (i.e., high β ) and low enough coordination cost with new suppliers (i.e., low ˜ κ ),ν > 0, in which case ∂ν ∂β > 0 and ∂ν ∂˜ κ > 0 ; furthermore for high enough β and low enough ˜ κ the firm will entirely forego long-term supply relationships and set n* = 0 , resulting in ν = 1. In general, in each period there will beν new and1− ν long-term supplierson average.
Model Predictions
The theoretical model developed in this section has two main implications.First, it establishes the importance of factors like trust that arise in a multi-period setting and explores how supplier cooperation can be sustained in such a setting. In a single period model, supplier incentives are provided by reducing the number of suppliers to the point where they acquire significant bargaining power (Bakos and Brynjolfsson 1993a, b) . In the incomplete contracting framework a participant's bargaining power and corresponding incentives are proportional to its Shapley Value (Hart and Moore 1990) , which with n suppliers is n (n +1)for the firm and 1 n(n +1) for each supplier. By contrast, in a multi-period setting, supplier incentives are proportional to δ −n . For reasonable discount rates and for typical numbers of suppliers, repeat relationships are significantly more powerful in providing incentives than mechanisms based on reducing the number of suppliers (see Figure 1 ). While a mechanism based on the Shapley
Value quickly loses its power as the number of suppliers increases beyond 2 or 3, a mechanism based on repeated interaction can provide considerable incentives with a significantly higher number of suppliers.
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This allows firms to provide suppliers' incentives without inordinate fit penalties. Furthermore, when fit considerations dictate a larger number of suppliers, the incentives of these suppliers can be increased by raising their discount factors, for instance by shortening the length of time between successive interactions.
Thus our theory argues that an important motivation for reducing the number of suppliers is to make it easier to maintain repeated relationships with the remaining suppliers. This is an argument that is absent in the most cited prior papers on this topic (e.g. Malone, Yates and Benjamin, 1987; Bakos and Brynjolfsson, 1993a,b; Clemons, Reddi and Row, 1993 ). While it is theoretically possible to reduce the number of suppliers while also reducing the amount of repetition (e.g. by practicing "serial monogamy"
with one supplier at a time while never returning to a previous supplier), the trust argument we make predicts that a reduction in suppliers will be empirically correlated with increased repetition. Second, our model explains how the characteristics of the setting affect the optimal number of suppliers and the fraction of repeated relationships, and leads to a number of testable hypotheses about both organizational factors and IT. Specifically, it predicts that the optimal number of suppliers will increaseas the importance of fit increases, as coordination costs decrease, as non-contractible relationshipspecific supplier investments decrease, and as the contractibility and measurability of supplier performance increases. Regarding the fraction of repeated relationships, it predicts that in addition to its inverse relationship to the number of suppliers, it will increase as the importance of non-contractible relationship-specific supplier investments increases and when coordination costs with new suppliers are higher.We examine each of these model predictions in more detail in the sections that follow. Codifiability and Measurability. When the terms and requirements of supplier contracts are relatively easy to spell out and communicate in a legal contract (i.e., contractibility μ is high), and when the activities and deliverables of these suppliers can be easily measured and monitored, (i.e., measurability m is high), there is less need to provide incentives for noncontractible investments (Fitoussi and Gurbaxani 2008) , and therefore in these situations we would expect firms to employ more suppliers.
Asset Specificity and Supplier Investments. As the specificity of a supplier relationship increases (i.e., the more unique the requirements or processes faced by the suppliers), the greater the relationship specific investments required of the suppliers (i.e., the higher are Xand β) and therefore we would expect firms to employ fewer suppliers and have a higher fraction of repeated relationships.
Asset specificity is also a factor in the IT used to coordinate supplier relationships as technology highly specific to the relationship or the vendor can lead to lock-in. Vendors typically take strategic actions intended to increase switching costs (Chen and Forman 2006) . For instance, prior research has demonstrated that asset specific information technologies such as Electronic Data Interchange (EDI), which are generally tailored to a given firm or pair of firms, can lock firms into a relationship (Srinivasan et. al. 1994 , Iacovou et. al. 1995 , Zhu et al 2006 . In our setting, buyer firms that rely on vendor specific technologies to coordinate their relationships will have high supplier setup cost K and thus may find it more difficult to engage new suppliers. We therefore expect that the use of vendor specific technologies is associated with fewer suppliers.
Data
To test our theory, we partnered with the research firm Illuminas to develop and implement a global web-based survey of IT sourcing decisions. The survey was conducted from November 14, 2007 to December 5, 2007 and the respondents were involved in the management of IT suppliers in 1355 firms in 12 countries. We surveyed a stratified sample of global firms in order to capture a representative sample of firms of various sizes in the United States, Europe, the Asia Pacific region, and in emerging markets.
Our goal was to sample 250 firms from the United States and 100 firms from each of France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Australia, China, India, Korea, Japan, Brazil, Mexico and India.
The survey solicited data on IT sourcing behavior (e.g. number of bids solicited, number of vendors contracted with, number of vendors used for implementation, and the ongoing nature of relationships), organizational and technological determinants of supply base size (e.g. asset specificity, technology use, codifiability of contracts, mutual monitoring, decentralization of decision rights), IT investments and use (e.g. total IT expenses per employee, percent of IT expenditures outsourced, deployment of coordination IT and vendor specific IT) and firm characteristics (e.g. firm size, location of headquarters and global establishments).
The sample was stratified to include 25% small enterprises (between 20-100 employees), 25% medium sized enterprises (between 100-999 employees in the United States and between 100-499 firms in the rest of the world), and 50% large enterprises (greater than 1,000 employees in the United States and greater than 500 employees in the rest of the world). The resulting sample included 333 firms with less than 100 employees (25%), 425 firms with between 100 and 999 employees (31%), and 479 firms with more than 1000 employees (35%) (Mean Number of Employees = 10,463, S.D. = 39,705.56, Min = 20, Max = 500,000), for a total of 1355 firms. The numbers of respondents by region and industry are displayed in Table 2 . Descriptive statistics by country and industry are provided in Tables 3 and 4 .
These data provide some of the first empirical evidence on IT supplier networks across different countries and to our knowledge represent the largest global survey of IT procurement and governance. IT procurement is a natural context in which to study supply chain governance as vendor selection, contracting, incentives and fit are critical to sourcing strategies in this setting (Gurbaxani 1996) . We intend to make the data publicly available (subject to oversight by the survey firm) in order to promote replication of empirical results and to encourage further work on global IT sourcing strategies. 
Trends in Global IT Supply and Procurement
Firms in our sample work with 5.5 suppliers of IT products and services on a regular basison average, with some firms working with up to 200 suppliers at a time. The data reveal several interesting trends. First, a plurality of these firms are maintaining a stable supply base, while significant minorities are moving to fewer suppliers ormoving to more suppliers: 40% of firms have increased the number of suppliers they solicit bids from compared to five years ago (11% have reduced the number they solicit bids from), 32% have increased the number of suppliers they purchase IT hardware and software from (14% have reduced this number), 30% have increased the number of suppliers they use for IT implementation (15% have reduced this number), and 28% have increased the number of suppliers they engage for the purchase of contract IT services (15% have reduced this number). A substantial fraction of firms (42% to 50%) have maintained the same number of suppliers over the last five years (see Figure 2) . Globally, firms solicit bids from 6 vendors per solution on average -twice as many as the average of 3 vendors they actually purchase from.
The data indicate that in determining the number of suppliers, firms adopt one of two diverging approaches. Firms reporting a reduction in the number of suppliers employ statistically different mean numbers of suppliers than firms reporting an increase in the number of suppliers (4.5 compared to 7.1, tstatistic = -1.87, p < .05) suggesting that moves to fewer and more suppliers among two subpopulations in our sample represent two distinct diverging strategies. Firms reporting a move to fewer suppliers over the last five years cite a desire to 'build strategic partnerships with a smaller number of trusted vendors' and a need to 'simplify IT deployments' as the top two reasons for reducing their number of suppliers, providing some evidence that trust and repeated interaction are correlated with smaller supplier networks.Firms reporting a move to more suppliers over the last five years cite the need to 'gain (access to) a wider array of business and technical expertise' to fit the needs of the firm and the 'organization's overall growth needs' as the top two reasons for increasing their number of suppliers, providing evidence of the influence of fit needs on increasing the number of suppliers. 
Currently working with your organization
Used in the last 5 years, but not currently working with your organization
Researched, certified or vetted but never worked with before
Your organization had no contact with prior to this project "Thinking about the vendors with whom you ultimately contracted to purchase, how many were . . . "
Researched, certified or vetted but never worked with before
Second, we see strong evidence of repeated interactions and ongoing relationships. Globally, 72% of the bids solicited by firms in our sample were from vendors they are currently working with or have worked with in the last five years, while only 11% were from vendors they have never had contact with before. Evidence of repeated interactions is also strong when looking at actual purchases. Globally, 74% of the suppliers used by firms in our sample are vendors they are currently working with or have worked with in the last five years, while only 10% are vendors with no prior contact. After components are purchased, a majority of firms work with the same vendors for implementation (64%) and for ongoing service (54%) as those they purchased the IT solution from. Thus the majority of buyer-supplier relationships in markets for IT products and services develop through repeated interactions over time and spot markets characterized by one-off purchases from unknown vendors are rare.
Third, as shown in Figure 3 , there are considerable differences in supplier strategiesacross countries, and in particular the number of suppliers firms contract with (notably Japan vs. US vs. Europe) and across industries (notably high tech vs. low tech). For example, Japanese firms in our sample tend to maintain significantly fewer supplier relationships and tend to work with the same suppliers repeatedly.
On average, Japanese firms work with 3.2 IT suppliers on a regular basis, while U.S. firms work with 6.2 IT suppliers, a statistically significant difference (t-statistic = -2.45, p < .01).
Figure 4: Size of IT Supply Networks by Industry
In addition, for Japanese firms, 79% of the suppliers they contract with are firms they have worked with in the past and are currently working with, while in the U.S. this figure is only 53%, in Europe 55%, in emerging markets 50%, and in Asia 55%. Across countries, the average number of IT suppliers firms work with on a regular basis ranges from 3.2 in Japan to 10.1 in Mexico. There are also considerable differences across industries as shown in Figure 4 . High tech sectors tend to work with significantly more IT suppliers on a regular basis (Energy = 10.3 suppliers, Software Development = 9.1, High-Tech Manufacturing = 9.0, Telecom = 7.0), while low tech sectors tend to engage fewer suppliers on average (Non-Tech Manufacturing = 3.9, Non-Tech Retail = 3.9, Wholesale = 3.9, Government = 3.8).
Finally, our data show that there is a high degree of asset specificity in supply relationships for IT products and services and that contracts are difficult to codify, monitor and measure. 'monitorable' (66%), or 'measurable' (50%). These broad trends and statistics highlight the heterogeneity in firms' strategies and the need for integrative theory that captures the complexity and diversity of sourcing governance decisions. In the next two sections we develop an integrative empirical framework that addresses the heterogeneity of sourcing strategies observed in our data.
Empirical Estimation
Variable Construction
Dependent Variables
Our primary empirical goal was to estimate how certain firm characteristics, suggested by theory and our analytical model, are correlated with the number of suppliers firms employ and the degree to which they engage in repeated relationships with their suppliers over time. Thus the dependent variables in our empirical estimations are the fraction of suppliers in a repeated relationship, which we measured by asking respondents to specify the percentage of suppliers (i.e., a value between 0 and 100) with whom their firm is already working with or has worked with in the last five years (Percent of Repeated
Relationships), and the number of IT vendors firms work with on a regular basis (Number of Vendors).
We also Codifiability and Measurability. In order to measure the degree to which the terms and requirements of vendor contracts are codifiable and the degree to which suppliers' activities and output are observable, we created two distinct yet complementary survey questions for each dimension and we asked respondents to "think about formal expectations, including contracts and formally specified deliverables."
To measure codifiability we solicited responses along two dimensions: the degree to which terms and conditions could be legally codified in a contract and the degree to which the terms and requirements were easy to communicate and understand. To assess the former we asked respondents: "When thinking about the specific terms and requirements you agree to with IT vendors, how many of those terms and requirements would you classify as codified -meaning that a written and agreed upon document specifies in detail your terms and requirements" (Codifiable Terms). To assess the latter we asked: "When thinking about the specific terms and requirements you agree to with IT vendors, how many of those terms and requirements would you classify as easy to communicate and understand -meaning that your terms and requirements are easy to explain and vendors find them easy to understand" (Clear Requirements).
In order to assess measurability we measured the degree to which vendors' activities and outputs can be easily measured and monitored. We asked respondents whether the specific contractual terms and requirements they agree to with IT vendors can be classified as "measurable in outcome" (Measurable Performance) and also assessed the monitorability of vendors' activities by asking the following question:"When thinking about the specific terms and requirements you agree to with IT vendors, how many of those terms and requirements would you classify as monitorable -meaning that vendor activities specified in your terms and requirements can be easily observed and monitored." (Monitorable Activities)
Asset Specificity and Supplier Investment. Asset specificity is a proxy for the amount of relationship specific investments that suppliers must make in order to fulfill a given buyers' requirements.
In order to assess this dimension of asset specificity and to proxy for relationship specific investments required of suppliers we asked respondents to agree or disagree with the following statement and rated their agreement or disagreement on a five point Likert scale: "Your vendors must acquire significant information, knowledge and skills specific to your company to adequately deliver on either formal or informal terms and requirements." (Asset Specificity) We normalized the above five variables (CodifiableTerms, ClearRequirements, Measurable Performance, Monitorable Activities, Asset Specificity) by subtracting from each observation the mean and dividing by the standard deviation of the corresponding variable.
Asset specificity is also at play in the information technologies used to coordinate the relationships between buyer and suppliers. Technologies used to coordinate the relationship that are highly specific to the relationship or the vendor can lead to lock-in by increasing the switching cost to a different supplier. We measure the use of such vendor specific IT in supply relationships by asking respondents whether they utilized a) "custom client web-portals provided by your vendors" (Vendor Specific Portals), b) "collaboration and document management tools" (Vendor Collaboration Tools) and c) "vendor relationship management tools" (Vendor Management Tools) to "communicate with your IT vendors," all measured by yes/no answers and recorded as binary dummy variables. We added these three responses to construct a variable measuring the use of vendor-specific IT to support supplier relationships (Vendor Specific IT).
Control Variables
Firm Scale. In order to control for scale effects we asked respondents to report firms' total number of employees (Total Employees). We normalized this variable by subtracting from each observation the mean and dividing by the standard deviation of the variable.
IT Expenses. In order to control how a firm's total IT budget might affect the number of IT suppliers, we asked respondents to report their firms' "total IT expenditures including all computers, software, data communications (including via phone line), and people" (Total IT $). We normalized the total IT expenditures variable by subtracting the mean from each observation and dividing by the standard deviation.
Outsourcing. Firms that rely more on market procurement may have experience with outsourcing and may have developed processes for selecting and vetting suppliers and a proclivity for market procurement. To control for unobservable firm characteristics correlated with a reliance on the market, we control for the percentage of IT expenditures outsourced (% Outsourced), measured independently of the number of suppliers firms work with. Table 5 shows the variables we constructed from the survey data, the corresponding parameters in our theoretical model, and the corresponding expected sign of the regression coefficientsin predicting the fraction of repeated supplier relationships. This last column is based on the hypotheses derived from our theoretical model and thus summarizes these hypotheses. 
Empirical Specifications
To better understand the roles of trust, cost and incentives in supplier networks we estimated the relationships between our parameters of interest, the fraction of suppliers with whom firms engage in repeated relationships, and the number of IT vendors in firms' IT supply networks.
First, in accordance with Table 5 ,we estimated three linear models predicting the fraction of repeated relationships firms use based on measures of firm size, IT expenditures, the fraction of IT budgets outsourced, the number of IT vendors, asset specificity and coordination IT on using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) specifications:
FractRepRelationships= α + β 1 TotalEmployees + β 2 TotalIT $ + β 3 %Outsourced + β 4 NumberofSuppliers + β 5 AssetSpecificity + β 6 NumberofSuppliers × AssetSpecificity +
We then estimated, in accordance with 
Specification Tests and Robustness Checks
We conducted several specification tests and robustness checks of our empirical models to make sure our analyses were not confounded by data anomalies or specification errors. First, we conducted
Breusch-Pagan and Cook-Weisberg tests for heteroskedasticity, which reject the null hypothesis of spherical disturbances ( 2 χ =1237.47, p< .01). We therefore implemented Huber-White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors and note that these reduced the significance of our estimates and generated much more conservative results. Second, we calculated centered and uncentered variance inflation factors (VIFs) for the independent variables specified in our models to test for multicollinearity in our specifications. A variance inflation factor of 10 has been proposed as a cutoff for acceptable levels of variance inflation due to multicollinearity (Kutner et al. 2004) . No variance inflation factors for any of the independent variables in our models exceeded 6.0 and only 3 of 43 variables exceeded 4.5, indicating little chance of multicollinearity affecting our results. Third, we clustered standard errors by country and by industry as additional checks against our data being clustered by region of collection or by industry.
These specifications did not produce estimates that differed in any meaningful way from those we report, which include dummy variables for the 12 countries and 15 industries in our sample. We also conducted robustness checks by including controls for industry/country simultaneously to test the effects of particular industries in particular countries with no change in our results. Finally, to check for the influence of outliers on our parameter estimates we calculated standardized dfbetas for each of our 43 variables in our two main specifications. Dfbetas show how much a coefficient would change if any given observation were dropped from the data. Calculating dfbetas for each independent variable produces variables that ranged from a minimum to a maximum change in the coefficients produced by removal of any single observation, one for each independent variable. Only one observation in one of 43 variables, Total IT Expenditure, produced a dfbeta greater than the cutoff of 2 proposed by Belsley et al. (1980) , meaning no influential outliers exist in any of our other independent variables. This one observation produced a dfbeta of 5.2. We dropped the observation from the regressions to see how it would affect parameter estimates and found no qualitative change in any parameter estimates or the statistical significance of any parameters. We therefore retained the observation for analysis.
The empirical results, shown in Tables 7 and 8 ,are robust to these specification tests and robustness checks and lend support to the hypotheses derived from our integrated theoretical model, as can be seen by comparing Tables7 and 8 with the rightmost columns of Tables 5 and 6 .
Regression Results
Determinants of Repeated Relationships with Suppliers
We first examined the determinants of the degree to which firms engage in repeated relationships with their suppliers. Our model predicts that repeated relationships will be inversely correlated with the number of employed suppliers. When the importance of fit is high and firms engage a large number of suppliers in order to maximize fit at the expense of incentives, they are less likely to engage in long-term contracts and more likely to switch suppliers when fit can be increased by doing so. Our data support this hypothesis, as reported in Table 7 . Model 1 shows a strong correlation between employing fewer suppliers and engaging them in long-term relationships: firms that take on more suppliers are less likely to contract with them repeatedly (β 4 =-.300, p< .01).Employing one more supplier is associated with a 0.3% decrease in the fraction of repeated relationships on average. These results support the hypothesis that as firms contract with a large number of suppliers they engage in fewer repeated relationships.
Model 2 shows that, consistent with our predictions about trust, higher asset specificity is associated with a greater fraction of repeat relationships with suppliers (β 5 = 3.95, p< .01).Firms that require greater specialized information, knowledge and skills from suppliers to adequately deliver on sourcing requirements not only rely on fewer suppliers for their IT procurement needs, but also enter into longer term contracts with them, engaging a greater fraction of their supply base in repeated relationships.
A one standard deviation increase in asset specificity is associated with a 4% increase in the fraction of suppliers with whom firms have previously contracted within the last five years. This supports the hypothesis that firms requiring suppliers to acquire information, knowledge and skills specific to the relationship, rely to a greater extent on long term contracting and repeated relationships. We suspect that establishing trusted relationships with suppliers is an important reason for firms with specific assets, technology and processes to rely on fewer suppliers. Suppliers must make greater non-contractible relationship specific investments when buyers display greater asset specificity in their processes and technology. Given the threat of hold up suppliers face when making investments in learning, process reengineering and technology that are not transferable to other clients, incentives are necessary to motivate them to make non-contractible investments in the supply relationship. These incentives can be created by reducing the number of suppliers, thus increasing supplier bargaining power (Bakos & Brynjolfsson 1993a, b) , or by entering long-term relationships (Piore and Sabel 1984, Helper et. al. 2000) . In our sample, of the firms that have moved to fewer suppliers in the last five years 42% say they did so to build "a strategic network of trusted vendors" (the second most popular response after "to simplify IT deployments" which was reported by 44% of these firms).
This view is further supported by the interaction between the number of suppliers and asset specificity, which is highly significant and negatively correlated with the fraction of repeated relationships (β 6 = -.245, p< .01). Thus asset specificity strongly moderates the negative relationship between the number of suppliers and the fraction of repeated relationships. In other words, under conditions of greater asset specificity, the negative relationship between the number of suppliers and the percentage of repeated relationships is even more pronounced: when firms' assets are more specific and the need for relationship specific investments by suppliers is greater, the percentage of repeated relationships increases faster as the supply base shrinks.This supports the hypothesis that creating trust is an important motivation for repeated relationships with suppliers.
Finally in Model 3 we find thatcontrolling for total IT expenditures, the use of information and communication technologies for the express purpose of communicating with IT vendors isnegatively correlated with long term repeated relationships. Specifically, the use of Coordination IT is negatively associated with longer-term relationships (β 7 = -2.25, p< .1). This finding is consistent with the hypothesis thatthe use of ITto reduce the costs of coordination withsuppliers is correlated with a smaller fraction of repeated relationships with these suppliers, and corroborates the idea that as firms use advanced IT that reduces coordination and search costs they tend to contract with more suppliers and to have less repeated interaction with them, switching between suppliers more often as they seek a better fit for their demand.
Determinants of the Number of Suppliers
We subsequently examined the determinants of the number of suppliers, including specific variables designed to measure a) the importance of fit, b) asset specificity and trust, c) contractibility and monitorability, d) use of coordination technologies, and e) switching costs and lock-in due to vendorspecific IT. We present these results in Table 8 . Notes: OLS estimation with robust standard errors. *** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .10 
Control Variables
We control for firm size, total IT expenditures and the percentage of IT outsourced. As shown in Table 8 , we do not find evidence of a scale effect on the IT supply base (firm size is unrelated to the number of suppliers). We do find a positive and statistically significant relationship between Total IT Spending and the Number of Suppliers (e.g., in Model 1, β 2 = 2.80, p < 0.05). IT spending, however, is a proxy for firms' total demand for IT, and thus could potentially drive a larger number of IT suppliers through firms' demand for more IT. For this reason we treat Total IT spending as a control variable and rely on our specific variables of coordination IT and vendor-specific IT to assess the impact of IT on the number of suppliers, controlling for total IT demand.
We measure the percent of IT outsourcing mainly to control for unobservable firm effects that may correlate with the size of the supply base. For example, managers that choose to outsource large portions of their total IT budget may be inclined to choose a larger supplier base. Thus the fraction of IT budget outsourced captures characteristics of firms and managers that make them more likely to rely on the market rather than internal firm organization. Still, the positive correlation between the percentage of IT outsourced and the number of vendors controlling for firm size and total IT spending (β 3 = .381, p <
.01 in Model 1) provides corroboration of the importance of fit costs in predicting supply base size. As firms increase the fraction of the IT budget that is outsourced they necessarily outsource a greater number of IT assets and IT labor activities and theirrequirements become more diverse requiring a greater variety of specialized services. To fit these needs, firms maintain a larger supplier base.
Fit Effects
We see strong evidence of fit effects in the relationship between the breadth of applications used by the firm and the number of suppliers they employ. In Model 1, after controlling for the size of the firm and total IT expenditures,implementation of two additional application classes is associated with one additional supplier on average (β 4 = .523, p < .01). This result lends support to our theoretical conclusion that as the scope of requirements increases more suppliers are needed to fulfill those requirements. Overall, the findings on application breath effects, number of implementation sites, and outsourcing effects support the hypothesis that increased importance of fit induces a firm to employ more suppliers.
Asset Specificity and Trust
In Model 2 we introduce measures of the asset specificity of vendor investments, and we find strong support for the role of asset specificity in reducing the number of suppliers. In measuring asset specificity we asked respondents to rate the degree to which "vendors must acquire significant information, knowledge and skills specific to the firm to adequately deliver on either formal or informal requirements." Firms that require greater specialized information, knowledge and skills from suppliers to adequately deliver on sourcing requirements rely on fewer suppliers for their IT procurement needs. A one standard deviation increase in asset specificity is associated with approximately 1.3 fewer suppliers on average (β 6 = -1.29, p< .01). This supports the hypothesis that firms requiring suppliers to acquire information, knowledge and skills specific to the relationship, rely on fewer suppliers.
Contractibility and Performance Measurement
Models 3 and 4addvariables measuringcontractibility and monitorability. Specifically, the variables introduced in Model 3 measure the degree to which a written contract can specify all necessary terms and requirements of the vendor relationship and the degree to which the terms and conditions are "easy to communicate and understand." The variables introduced in Model 4 measure the degree to which, given a written contract, vendors' activities "can be easily observed and monitored," and whether "the quality of the products and services vendors are contracted to provide … can be easily assessed and measured."
We find no statistically significant relationship between contractibility and the number of suppliers; nor do we find evidence of a relationship between the comprehensibility of contracts and the number of suppliers. We do however find clear evidenceindicating that when the performance of a supply relationship is measurable, for example because the quality of the products and services provided by suppliers can be easily assessed, firms tend to employ more suppliers(β 9 = 1.05, p < .05). A one standard deviation increase in measurability is associated with one additional supplier on average. This supports the hypothesis that greaterability to measure performance, which is one aspect of monitorability,is associated with employing more suppliers.
There are several possible explanations for this pattern of relationships. First, the ability to assess and measure outcomes is a prerequisite for contractibility and is likely to be more important than the observability of activities. Punishment and reward in repeated interactions is enabled by the observability of the quality of output. If quality is unobservable or not measurable, it becomes difficult to write a verifiable contract that requires the fulfillment of products and services to specification. Second, if quality is measurable, firms have several incentive mechanisms,beyond writing clear understandable and verifiable contracts, with which they can motivate suppliers to deliver the needed level of quality. For example, firms could enter intorepeated, long-term interactions with suppliers they trust, and reward (or punish) the provision (or lack) of quality by extending (or terminating) the relationship, which can promote cooperation without requiring well specified contracts as demonstrated in our analytical model.
Third, as performance becomes more measurable, buyer firms need only observe supplier output every so often, interacting with them on fewer occasions. However, since performance measurements are noisy, firms must constantly interact with their suppliers to monitor performance (and investment). As performance becomes more measurable, firms can therefore take on more suppliers (and interact with each less frequently), to increase their bargaining power and lower their fit costs, without an increased threat of non-cooperative behavior by the suppliers.
Finally in Model 5 we introduce the deployment of coordination IT and vendor-specific IT, while controlling for total IT expenditures.
Coordination IT
As predicted by Malone, Yates and Benjamin (1987) and Bakos (1997) , increased use of three "coordination technologies" (i.e. extranets, project management software, and third party hosted intranets like Hyper Office) is associated with a significant increase in the number of suppliers (β 11 = 2.60, p < 0.01). 4 On average in our sample, each additional coordination technology adopted, on a scale from 0 to 3, was associated with 2.6 additional suppliers. Thus firms that adopted all three coordination technologies on average employed almost 8 more suppliers in their IT procurement than firms that had adopted none of the technologies, all while holding total IT demand constant. We cannot necessarily conclude that coordination technology caused the increase in the number of suppliers-it is possible, even likely, that both decisions were made jointly and the causality runs in both directions. However, the high significance level in the association suggests that it is not a mere coincidence that these decisions co-vary, representing some of the most direct empirical evidence to date that supports the predictions of coordination theory in buyer supplier relationships. In particular, these findingsare consistent with the 4 Each of these technologies was also statistically significant at at least the 0.1 level when considered individually. 
Vendor-Specific IT
On the other hand, we find that use of three vendor-specific technologies (i.e., vendor-specific portals, collaboration and document management tools, and vendor management systems), which can create switching costs and cause lock-in to specific vendors, is associated with a smaller number of suppliers (β 12 = -0.985, p < .0.05). On average, each additional vendor-specific technology adopted, on a scale from 0 to 3, is associated with 1 fewer supplier. Thus firms that adopted all three vendor specific technologies on average employed 3 fewer suppliers than firms that had adopted none of these technologies, again controlling for total IT demand. This supports the hypothesis that technologies that increase a firm's switching costs are associated with the use of fewer suppliers. This result corroborates both the notion that asset specificity encourages use of a smaller supplier base in conjunction with relationship specific investments and highlights that different types of IT have different implications for supply chain governance. In particular, vendor-specific technologies that increase switching costs are likely to lead to fewer suppliers while technologies that lower search and coordination costs are likely to lead to an increased number of suppliers.
Discussion
Our theoretical framework integrates existing theories about increases and decreases in the number of suppliers and the degree to which firms engage in repeated relationships with suppliers.
Specifically, we analyze the role of fit, search costs, coordination theory, transaction costs and asset specificity, incomplete contracts, and cooperation in multi-period settings. In addition, our multi-period model allows us to consider the critical role of trust in supplier relationships.
Weassess the implications of our model using empirical evidence from a unique data set obtained via a tailored survey of 1355 large multinational firms' IT sourcing decisions. Using multiple regression, we identified the key characteristics of the organizational, industrial and technological setting which were associated with both the use of repeated relationships and more or fewer suppliers. Of particular note, we found that a reduction in suppliers was strongly associated with an increase in repeated relationships, consistent with our integrative model. Moreover, each of the key variables suggested by our integrative model had the predicted signsin the empirical analysis. Specifically, organizational and technological asset specificity, the desire to develop trust and the need to induce non-contractible investments were correlated with fewer suppliers, while reductions in search and transaction costs, the need for fit between firms' needs and suppliers' skills, and the ability to measure supplier performancewere correlated with more suppliers. Our analysis reveals that non-contractible specific supplier investments and trust are particularly important in leading to smaller supplier networks.
Our model and empirical results underscore the need for an integrated approach to understanding supplier networks. In particular, there are multiple forces at work, both technological and organizational.
Prior models, which focused on only one component, provide useful insights, but are ultimately incapable of fully capturing the trade-offs faced by firms as they make decisions about their supplier networks. Our model shows how information technology can reduce search and transaction costs, facilitating relationships with a larger number of suppliers, but can also lock firms in to a smaller set of suppliers.
The empirical analysis shows that both effects are significant. Furthermore, organizational idiosyncrasies, like the benefits of improved fit between needs and capabilities, suggest that increasing the number of suppliers will be beneficial, but that at the same time, the need to foster trust pushes firms toward working with fewer suppliers, at least when there are important non-contractible relationship specific investments at stake. Again, our model captures both types of effects and the data are rich enough to identify and distinguish them.
Perhaps the most important theoretical contribution is the explicit analysis of a multi-period game between a firm and its suppliers. The repeated nature of the relationship brings to the fore the importance of trust, as highlighted by the empirical coefficients on asset specificity and performance measurement.
Greater asset specificity increases the risks associated with untrustworthy relationships, and as theory predicts, drives firms toward working with a smaller set of trusted suppliers. Conversely, when performance measurement is improved, firms can more easily expand their supplier base while implementing incentive contracts with a high signal to noise ratio.
We also find empirical support for trust-based mechanisms in our analysis of repeated relationships. The desire to fit idiosyncratic needs that vary across countries and offices encourages firms to reduce the number of repeated relationships they enter into. In contrast, we find, consistent with our predictions about trust, that higher asset specificity is associated with more long term contracting and a greater fraction of repeat relationships with suppliers. Firms that require greater specialized information, knowledge and skills from suppliers to adequately deliver on sourcing requirements not only rely on fewer suppliers for their IT procurement needs, but also enter into longer term contracts with them, engaging a greater fraction of their supply base in repeated relationships.Finally, we find the use of coordination ITisnegatively correlated with long term repeated relationships. This finding corroborates the idea that as firms use advance IT to lower search and coordination costs they tend to contract with more suppliers and to have less repeated interaction with them, switching between suppliers more often as they seek a better fit for their demand.
In light of the multiple and potentially conflicting determinants of the number of suppliers and the repeated nature of supply relationships, it is not surprising that some firms have been increasing the number of suppliers they work with even as others work with fewer suppliers. Firms face different organizational and technological environments and thus their optimal strategies vary. Our integrated model highlights these trade-offs, unifying the relevant theories and promoting a contingent rather than a deterministic view of the role of IT in supply chain governance. Our empirical analysis of a new, largescale dataset supports the notion that each of the components of the integrated theory has something to contribute to our overall understanding of trust, costs and incentives in global supplier networks.
Limitations and Future Work
Although we have analyzed some of the first large scale data on IT sourcing decisions and developed a unified model of the size of global supplier networks, integrating several theories that provide conflicting predictions about supply base augmentation and reduction, two important limitations to our analyses remain.
First, as with most empirical examinations of sourcing strategies, we do not have data on supplier markets. Clearly, the state of the sourcing market can influence firms' choices regarding which suppliers they choose, the number of suppliers they work with on a regular basis and the length of their contracts.
Competitive markets can increase firms' options and the relative stability of established supplier firms can affect the degree to which buyers rely on a particular firm for extended periods of time (Gao et al 2010) .
In addition, the emergence of new low cost IT suppliers in emerging markets like India and Russia could also affect firms' sourcing decisions as well as the size of their supplier networks. Our controls for industry and country effects should in part control for differences in supplier markets at the country and industry level, but some effects could remain. Unfortunately, we do not have access to primary data concerning the market structure of IT supply. We encourage data collection on supply side market structure and future work on supplier networks that takes market structure into account.
Second, our data are not longitudinal. We solicit data on trends in both bid solicitation and contracting, such as the move to fewer or more suppliers over the last five years and whether a given supply relationship has been repeated over time, but we do not observe the same firms' sourcing decisions over time in panel data. Although data on the degree to which relationships are repeated allow us to test our theoretical model, the lack of temporal variation in supply base data and accompanying firm characteristics makes it difficult to make causal claims about what drives firms' sourcing decisions. While our data give indications about the types of firms that typically have larger or smaller supplier networks and repeated or short lived relationships with suppliers, unobserved heterogeneity may still exist and we cannot claim to have identified the causal mechanisms that explain these relationships.
Conclusion
This paper addressed two key gaps in current research on the role of IT in supply chain governance: the lack of theoretical and empirical focus on repeated relationships and the role of distinct sets of information technologies with varying implications for supply chain structure.
We developed an integrated, multi-period model of the optimal number of suppliers that combines considerations from search and coordination theory, transaction cost economics, and incomplete contracts theory, and assessed our theoretical predictions using a new tailored dataset on the global IT sourcing decisions of 1355 firms in 12 countries. Our empirical results are consistent with this model. In particular,a reduction in the number of suppliers can be explained bythe desire to develop trust and the need to induce non-contractible relationship-specific investments and by organizational and technological asset specificity. On the other hand, investments in coordination technologies that reduce search costs and transaction costs are correlated with more suppliers, as are the need to optimize fit between firm needs and supplier skills. A key insight of both our model and empirical analysis is that the cooperation and trust developed through repeated interaction can offer strong incentives for relationshipspecific supplier investments.
